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Динамика идеологических маркеров:  февраль 2012

Dynamics of ideological markers: February 2012

Date posted: 13.03.2012 Print Full version

 According to the research conducted by the Sociological group "Rating", 52% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine's accession to the European Union. 34% do not support it. Other 15% - have not decided.

It should be noted that last year the number of supporters of the European integration has decreased to the level of 2009. Thus, in October 2009, Ukraine's accession to the European Union was supported by 51% of respondents, in April 2010 - 52%, in September 2010 - 57%, in January 2011 - 56%, and in April 2011 - 51% and in February 2012 - 52%. Therefore, the peak of support for the Ukraine's accession to the European Union occurred at the end of 2010 – the beginning of 2011.
 
Among the biggest supporters of the European integration are residents of the West (78%), somewhat less it is supported in the Centre (59%) and in the North (55%). Accordingly, they are more than 80% of supporters of Freedom, about 70% - of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, UDAR, Civil Position, and Strong Ukraine. Among the biggest opponents are voters of the CPU, two-thirds of which do not support Ukraine's accession to the European Union. Supporters of the Party of Regions are divided almost equally on this issue: 40% support European integration, 45% - do not support it.
 
The higher is the educational level of respondents, the younger they are, the more they support Ukraine's accession to the EU and the less they support the formation of a unified state with Russia and Belarus and granting Russian the status of the second official language.
 
However, 47% of respondents support the formation of a unified state with Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. 42% do not support it. Other 11% - have not decided.
 
Importantly, about 30% of respondents who support the formation of a unified state with Russia and Belarus, support Ukraine's accession to the EU at the same time.
 
As compared to last April, the number of such people has decreased by a quarter (in April there were almost 40% of them), which reflects the increasing polarization of the society by ideological markers. This is especially noticeable in the regions: the "pro-Russian" vector is gaining popularity in Donbas, in the South and in the East, the "pro-Western" vector - in the West of Ukraine. The fact that the number of unequivocal supporters and unequivocal opponents increases by the majority of markers also speaks in favor of this thesis.
 
Taking into account such peculiarities of responses, respondents were asked a direct question. Thus, according to respondents, signing the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more favorable to Ukraine (39%) than accession to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (36%). 26% - have not decided. Compared to last October the number of supporters of signing the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union has not decreased, yet the number of those who believe the Customs Union is more beneficial for the country has slightly increased (from 34 to 36%).
 
As a result, in the West, in the North and in the Centre of Ukraine the Agreement with the European Union is supported more. In Donbas, in the South and in the East - accession to the Customs Union. Although about 20% of proponents of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change support accession to the Customs Union; just like about 20% of proponents of the Party of Regions support the agreement with the European Union. Proponents of Strong Ukraine divided by half: 40% - are for the Agreement with the EU, 41% - are for the Customs Union with Russia.
 
46% of respondents supported granting Russian the status of the state language. Almost as many (45%) are against it. Other 8% - have not decided.
 
It should be noted that over the past two years the numbers of opponents and supporters of bilingualism were almost equal. However, when compared with 2009, the level of support for granting Russian the status of the state language has decreased (in 2009 it was more than 50%).
 
Among the biggest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (84%), the East (71%) and the South (65%). Accordingly, they are supporters of the CPU (72%), the Party of Regions (71%), the People's Party (58%) and Strong Ukraine (53%). Among the biggest opponents - supporters of Freedom, 100% of which do not support granting Russian the status of the state language.
 
The attitude towards Ukraine's accession to NATO has taken a turn for the worse of late: from 26% in September 2010 - to 24% - in January 2011, 22% - in April 2011 and 20% - in February 2010.
 
Over 68% of respondents do not support Ukraine's accession to NATO. Other 13% - have not decided.
 
The support for Ukraine's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance is strongly pronounced in the West of the country (about half of the respondents). Among supporters of parties the accession to NATO is traditionally defended mostly by supporters of Freedom and Civil Position.
 
Meanwhile, against the background of the aggravation of gas negotiations, the number of supporters of the idea to extend the term of stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine until 2042 has significantly decreased. Thus, over the year the number of supporters has decreased from 42% to 33%, the number of opponents has simultaneously increased - from 42 to 49%. 18% - have not decided on this issue. The initiative has suffered losses not only in the Centre and in the North, but also in the East, in the South and in Donbas, where it is supported by no more than a half of respondents.
 
Recently, the attitude towards the idea of ​​creating the trilateral "gas" consortium, where the property of the Ukrainian gas transport system will be distributed between Russia, the EU and Ukraine, has improved. Thus, over the last year (since January 2011) the support of the initiative has increased from 30 to 35%, and the number of opponents has at the same time decreased - from 42 to 37%.
 
Accordingly, the attitude towards the trilateral "gas" consortium has approached the level of 2009, when 36% supported the initiative and 35% - did not support it.
 
Taking into account the ambiguity of the initiative and the complexity of understanding it (almost 30% were unable to decide on their response), respondents were asked a clarifying question: "Do you support the idea of giving control over the Ukrainian gas transport system to Russia?"
 
Thus, the vast majority of respondents (78%) do not support the idea of giving control over the Ukrainian gas transport system to Russia. Only 8% support it. 14% of respondents could not decide on their attitude.
 
Residents of the South (22%) and proponents of the CPU (17%) support the idea of giving control over the Ukrainian gas transport system to Russia more than others. However, the idea is not supported by over 70% of proponents of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, by over 80% - of UDAR, by almost 90% - of Civil Position, Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, and by almost 100% - of Freedom.
 
24% of respondents support the idea to recognize OUN-UPA as participants of the struggle for Ukrainian independence, 57% of respondents - do not support it. Other 19% have not decided on this issue.
 
The attitude to this question is not fully formed and varies each year: after the level of support for the idea to recognize OUN-UPA has increased from 20 to 27% in 2011, it has decreased again to 24% in 2012, which is less than last year but more than the year before.
 
The idea to recognize OUN-UPA as participants of the struggle for Ukrainian independence is supported by over 90% of proponents of Freedom, the same number of proponents of the CPU do not support the idea.
 
Among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Civil Position, and UDAR the number of supporters of the recognition of OUN-UPA is almost the same as the number of opponents.
 
The idea is not supported by the vast majority of proponents of the Party of Regions (83%), Strong Ukraine (63%), the People's Party (67%) and the "against all" category (68%).
 
59% of respondents agreed with the statement that Holodomor in 1932-33 was the genocide against Ukrainian people. 26% did not agree with the statement, 16% - have not decided.
 
We should also pay attention to fluctuations of public opinion in relation to this issue. Thus, in March 2010 61% of respondents agreed with the thesis of genocide, in January 2011 their number decreased to 53%, and in April 2011 it increased again to 58%, it finally stabilized at the level of 59% in February 2012.
 
The thesis of ​​genocide is shared by almost 90% of residents of the West, by over 70% of residents of the North and the Center, and by about 40% - of the East and the South. The thesis is shared by nearly 40% of supporters of the Party of Regions and the CPU.
 
 
The target audience of the research: the population of Ukraine aged from 18 and older. Optional quantity: 4000 respondents. The methods of investigation: personal formalized interview according to the questionnaire (face to face). Measure of inaccuracy for the values close to 50% is less than 1.5%, for the values close to 30% – less than 1.3%, for the values close to 10% – less than 0.9. The period of completion: 10-24 of February 2012
 
The oblast’ distribution:
 
West: Volyns’ka, Transcarpathia, Ivano–Frankivs’ka, L’vivs’ka, Rivnens’ka, Ternopil’s’ka, Chernivets’ka.
Centre: Vinnyts’ka, Kirovograds’ka, Poltavs’ka, Khmel’nyts’ka, Cherkas’ka.
North: Kyiv, Kyivs’ka, Zhytomyrs’ka, Sums’ka, Chernihivs’ka.
South: AR Crimea, Odes’ka, Khersons’ka, Mykolaivs’ka, Sevastopol
East: Dnipropetrovs’ka, Zaporiz’ka, Kharkivs’ka.
Donbass: Donets’ka, Luhans’ka.

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